Games Strategies 游戏策略 One of the most interesting developments in recent years has been the application of a two-person bargaining game to the study of paranoid processes. Deutsch (1958,1962) had used this technique for study of personal and situational determinants of interpersonal trust and suspicion, Klein and Solomon (1966) studied the responses of schizophrenic patients in a two-person bargaining game in which the experimental confederate had assumed an exploitative strategy for the initial trials, and then subsequently adopted a conditionally cooperative strategy. Paranoid patients were found to maintain their noncooperative stance for a longer period after the confederate's reform. The authors question whether the paranoid rigidity was a result of the sinning confederate's initial exploitation, which might have reinforced the paranoid's suspicion, or whether it reflected a cognitive inability to adapt. 近年来最有趣的发展之一，是两个人讨价还价游戏在偏执过程研究中的应用。多伊奇(1958、1962)将这种技术用于研究人际信任和猜疑的个人与情境因素,克莱恩和所罗门(1966)研究了精神分裂症患者在两人讨价还价的游戏中的反应,在其中实验搭档在开始的尝试中采取一种剥削性的策略，然后随后采取了有条件的合作策略。偏执患者在实验搭档改变策略后较长一段时间内保持着不合作的态度。作者质疑偏执的顽固是由于有罪的实验搭档最初的剥削，这可能加强了偏执者的怀疑，或者是否反映了一种认知上适应的无能。 To study this, they set up a game situation in which the confederate's strategy shifted from unconditional to conditional cooperation (called the "lapsed saint" strategy), and also would shift from an unconditional noncooperation to conditional cooperation (this strategy they referred to as "reformed sinner"). Comparing groups of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics with a group of normal controls, the results indicate that the lapsed saint strategy produced higher levels of cooperation in the paranoids than in nonparanoid subjects. The reformed sinner strategy produced lower levels of exploitation in the paranoids as compared with nonparanoid subjects. The authors feel that their results are consistent with the power conflict view of paranoia as proposed by Ovesey (1955b). They write: 为了研究这一点，他们设置了一个游戏情境，在这个情境中，实验搭档的策略从无条件合作转变为有条件的合作(称为“堕落的圣徒”策略)，同时也会从无条件不合作转变为有条件的合作(他们称之为“改过自新的罪人”策略)。将偏执型和非偏执型精神分裂症患者组与一组正常对照组进行比较，结果表明，与非偏执型受试者相比，堕落的圣徒策略对偏执受试者比非偏执受试者产生了更高的合作水平[你严厉了，偏执者就合作了]。改过自新的罪人策略对偏执受试者比非偏执受试者产生了较低的剥削水平[你温和了，偏执者就难缠了]。作者认为他们的结果与Ovesey (1955b)提出的偏执症的权力冲突观点一致。他们写道: Perhaps the major issue at stake for the paranoid-schizophrenics in the present experimental situation is not when and whom to trust, but rather a concern with the balance of power.... The paranoid's strategy is designed to test and redefine the existing balance of power. Thus, when the sinner is punitive and tough, the paranoid is docile and cooperative; with the sinner's abrupt shift to a soft unconditional benevolence, the paranoids react by shifting in the direction of an exploitative and dominating strategy. With the saint the reverse is true. The paranoids are initially exploitative, but when the saint shifts to a strategy of punishing noncooperation, the paranoids rapidly shift to a cooperative pattern(Hartford and Solomon,1969,p.502). 在目前的实验情况下，对偏执型精神分裂症患者来说，最重要的问题可能不是什么时候信任谁，而是对权力平衡的关注……偏执者的策略旨在测试和重新定义现有的权力平衡。因此，当罪人具有惩罚性和严厉性时，偏执者是温顺和合作的;随着罪人突然转变为温和的、无条件的仁慈，偏执者的反应是转向剥削和支配的策略。圣人的情况正好相反。偏执者一开始是剥削性的，但当圣人转向惩罚不合作的策略时，偏执者迅速转向合作模式(哈特福德和所罗门，1969年，第502页)。 Thus the paranoid's stance is not indiscriminate but can be varied in accordance with the strategy of the other. These findings highlight the importance of the issues of power relations and control in the dynamics of paranoia. 因此，偏执者的立场不是不分青红皂白的，而是可以根据对方的策略而改变的。这些发现强调了权力关系和控制在偏执症动力学中的重要性。 There are methodological difficulties, however, in the study of trust and suspicion in such game strategies. As Kee and Knox(1970) have pointed out, the degree of manifest trust in such situations is related to the subject's subjective estimate that the other players will be trustworthy or not. It is thus necessary to distinguish in both trust and suspicion two related components—the observable choice behavior and a subjective state which underlies the manifest choice behavior. It would be important, therefore, to know the threshold at which subjective trust can become manifest as behavioral trust—the degree to which the subject feels that he can trust the other before he will in fact make a trusting decision. Such thresholds are undoubtedly determined by a variety of situational, structural, and internal dispositional factors. 然而，在这类博弈策略中信任与怀疑的研究存在方法论上的困难。正如Kee和Knox(1970)所指出的，在这种情况下，明显的信任程度与受试者对其他玩家是否值得信任的主观估计有关。因此，有必要区分信任和怀疑两个相关的组成部分——可观察的选择行为和作为显性选择行为基础的主观状态。因此，重要的是要知道主观信任可以表现为行为信任的阈值——在他做出信任决定之前，受试者感觉他可以信任对方的程度。这些阈值无疑是由各种情境、结构和内部性格因素所决定的。