Religious Belief Systems 宗教信仰系统 From this point of view, one can begin to understand the paranoid necessity to complete and stabilize the person's delusional system. We can also understand his need to bring all data into congruence with his delusion and his need to maintain it in the face of contradictory evidence. There is thus an analogy between the paranoid delusional system and belief systems, particularly religious belief systems in which such basic and fundamental needs are involved. It is not surprising, considering the nature of the motivational issues, that in this area more than others one finds a greater degree of rigidity and dogmatism. But in the interest of clarifying our understanding, we must ask what it is that distinguishes systems of religious belief from paranoid delusions. 从这个角度来看，我们可以开始理解一个人完成和稳定其的妄想系统的偏执必要性。我们也可以理解 他需要使所有的数据与他的妄想相一致，以及在面对矛盾的证据时他需要维持这种妄想。因此，偏执妄想系统与信仰系统，特别是 涉及到这种基本和根本需求的宗教信仰系统 之间存在着一种类比。考虑到动机问题的性质，在这一领域比其他领域更多地发现了更大程度的僵化和教条主义，这并不奇怪。但是，为了澄清我们的理解，我们必须问一问，是什么把宗教信仰体系与偏执妄想区分开来。 Religious belief systems are complex cognitive organizations which explain in a coherent fashion complex and difficult questions involving the origin of the universe, the relationship between the universe and the deity, the meaning of human existence, and the conditions of salvation. If one looks at the Judeo-Christian tradition, it represents a continuing and historically embedded effort to conceptualize and understand these and related questions. The earlier parts of the tradition were more of a retelling of the story of God's salvific action in Israelite history with only minimal attempts to theologize this history. Later parts of the tradition took the form of prophetic reflections on the history of divine intervention, particularly on the exodus and the subsequent desert experience which formed a central aspect of the Jewish historical and religious experience. The prophetic reflection was interpretive and more explicitly theological. Freud referred to such religious ideas as "illusions," stressing the role of human wishes in generating and maintaining such ideas. He offered a distinction, however, between such illusions and delusions. 宗教信仰体系是复杂的认知组织，它以连贯的方式解释复杂而困难的问题，涉及宇宙的起源、宇宙与神的关系、人类生存的意义以及救赎的条件。如果从犹太-基督教的传统来看，它代表了一种持续的、历史性的努力，以概念化和理解 这些问题和相关问题。传统的早期部分更多的是重述神在以色列历史上的救赎行动的故事，只是极少地尝试将这段历史神学化。传统的后期部分则是以预言的形式对神的干预历史进行反思，特别是对出埃及和随后的沙漠经历进行反思，这构成了犹太人历史和宗教经历的一个核心方面。预言性反思是解释性的，更明确的是神学性的。弗洛伊德把这种宗教观念称为"幻觉"，强调人的愿望在产生和维持这种观念中的作用。然而，他对这种幻觉和妄想作了区分。 What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes. In this respect they come near to psychiatric delusions. But they differ from them, too, apart from the more complicated structure of delusions. In the case of delusions, we emphasize as essential their being in contradiction with reality. Illusions need not necessarily be false—that is to say, unrealizable or in contradiction to reality.... Thus we call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification (1927,p.31). 幻觉的特点是它们来自人类的愿望。在这一点上，它们接近于精神病学上的妄想。但除了妄想的结构更复杂之外，它们也与它们不同。在妄想的情况下，我们强调它们与现实的矛盾是必不可少的。幻觉不一定是虚假的——也就是说，不可能实现的或与现实相矛盾的……。因此，当一个愿望的实现是其动机中的一个突出因素时，我们就把一个信念称为幻觉，而在这样做的时候，我们就不考虑它与现实的关系，正如幻觉本身不重视验证一样（1927,p.31）。 The distinction between illusions and delusions is slippery, however, since delusions are not without their kernel of historical truth. Waelder (1951) has referred to the Hebrew belief that they were the chosen people as a collective delusion. And in addition it is not altogether certain that religious illusions have not been maintained in the face of contradictory reality. Religious belief systems are formed in some degree in response to basic human needs—Freud's illusions—but the degree of closedness and resistance to change by experience is a function of the degree to which the belief system serves a defensive function in preserving the believer from inner psychic insecurity and dread. Where that underlying anxiety is more intense, there is a tendency for those who adhere to the belief system to regard the system as a whole without differentiation of its parts and to feel that preservation of the parts is essential to the preservation of the whole. This is reflected in an increased rigidity and dogmatism and a reluctance to even question any part of the complex of moral and speculative positions which compose the system. In the current reexamination and reconsideration of basic moral positions among religious groups, particularly the sensitive area of sexual morality and contraception, part of the problem has to do with this form of pressure toward closedness and rigidity. The problem is complicated by the more general shift from a climate of belief which demands adherence to established doctrine (closed) to a greater emphasis on personal realization and grasp of religious truth in its historical and emergent dimensions (open). 然而，幻想和妄想之间的区别是很滑稽的，因为妄想并非没有历史真相的内核。Waelder(1951)曾把希伯来人认为他们是被拣选的人的信念称为集体妄想。而此外，也不能完全肯定宗教幻想在矛盾的现实面前没有被维持。宗教信仰体系在一定程度上是为了回应人类的基本需求--弗洛伊德所说的幻觉——而形成的，但 封闭性和经验对改变 的抵抗程度，是信仰体系在多大程度上起到了维护信徒内心的不安全感和恐惧感的防御功能 的函数。在这种潜在的焦虑比较强烈的地方，信奉信仰体系的人就有一种倾向，即把这个体系看成一个整体，而不区分它的各个部分，并觉得保存部分对保存整体至关重要。这反映在更加僵化和教条主义，甚至不愿意对构成该体系的复杂的道德和推测性立场的任何部分提出质疑。在当前宗教团体对基本道德立场的重新审视和重新考虑中，特别是在性道德和避孕这一敏感领域，部分问题与这种形式的封闭性和僵化的压力有关。由于从要求遵守既定教义(封闭式)的信仰氛围向更加强调个人对宗教真理的历史和新兴层面的认识和把握(开放式)的更普遍转变，使问题变得更加复杂。 How, then, does one draw a line between the theocosmological delusions of Schreber and the belief system of religious men? Schreber's Memoirs read in part like an elaborate theological tract. His delusional system is a highly evolved and systematized attempt to organize and understand his experience in terms of a coherent theory. Organized doctrine represents a similar attempt to interpret human experience and give it meaning in terms of a divinely instituted plan and guidance. Both delusional and belief systems reach certain untestable conclusions which cannot be contradicted by available evidences. How in fact would one go about disproving Schreber's delusion that he was being transformed into a woman? How would one disprove the Christian assertion of the real presence in the Eucharistic sacrifice? We can recognize that a delusional system is in conflict with reality as we interpret it, but how does one go about proving that our interpretation is sane and that the delusional one is insane and in contradiction to reality? Ultimately we cannot. We can resort to an appeal to consensus or to practical and adaptive exigencies that are consequent on our interpretation rather than the delusional one—but these are not matters of evidence. The delusional system as well as the belief system is maintained on the basis of a prior emotional commitment, not on the basis of evidences. The illusion sets no store by verification. 那么，如何在史瑞伯的神学妄想和宗教人士的信仰体系之间划清界限呢？施雷伯的《回忆录》在一定程度上像是一部精心编写的神学小册子。他的妄想系统是一种高度进化和系统化的尝试，试图用一种连贯的理论来组织和理解他的经验。有组织的学说代表了一种类似的尝试，即用神制定的计划和指导来解释人类的经验并赋予其意义。妄想系统和信仰系统都会得出某些无法检验的结论，这些结论无法被现有的证据所抵触。事实上，如何去反驳史瑞伯的妄想，即他正在被改造成一个女人？如何反驳基督教关于圣体祭中真实存在的论断？我们可以认识到一个妄想的系统与我们解释的现实相冲突，但如何去证明我们的解释是理智的，而妄想的系统是疯狂的，与现实相矛盾的呢？最终我们无法做到。我们可以诉诸于对共识的呼吁，或者诉诸于我们的解释而不是妄想的解释所导致的实际和适应性的需要，但这些都不是证据问题。妄想系统和信仰系统都是在事先的情感承诺的基础上维持的，而不是在证据的基础上维持的。幻觉不重视验证。 The apologetic argument which supports a given religious belief system appeals to Biblical accounts as part of the base of evidence, but this is an appeal to an historically antecedent belief system. Apologetics must ultimately appeal to an acceptance through faith which lies beyond the reach of reason. But this brings us closer to the element or elements that distinguish delusional from belief systems. The delusional system is created anew by the psychotic in response to inner idiosyncratic needs and serves to isolate him from communal participation in inverse proportion to the degree of development of his pseudocommunity. The religious belief system, however, is not created anew, but is the product of a tradition which is in some degree institutionalized and has a significant history. The content of the system, therefore, is not idiosyncratic but answers to common needs and shared concerns of the community. Contrary to the effect of a delusional system, the belief system serves to unite the believer with a community of believers and this in direct proportion to the degree that he shares in the shared beliefs of the community. The belief system fosters integration with and membership in a community of believers, and this social interaction, as Erikson has pointed out, is an important component of the support that the community offers to the emerging sense of identity. 支持某一特定宗教信仰体系的辩解论证，呼吁将《圣经》的记载作为证据基础的一部分，但这是对历史上先有的信仰体系的呼吁。辩证学最终必须呼吁通过信仰来接受，而这种接受是理智所不能及的。但这使我们更接近区分妄想与信仰系统的要素。妄想系统是精神病患者根据内心的特异需求重新创造出来的，其作用是将他与社群的参与隔离开来，与他的伪社群的发展程度成反比。然而，宗教信仰体系并不是重新创造出来的，而是传统的产物，这种传统在一定程度上已经制度化，并且具有重要的历史。因此，制度的内容不是特异性的，而是回答了社会共同的需要和共同的关切。与妄想系统的效果相反，信仰系统的作用是将信徒与信徒群体联合起来，而这与他分享群体共同信仰的程度成正比。信仰体系促进了与信徒群体的融合和成员关系，正如埃里克森所指出的，这种社会互动是群体对新出现的身份感提供支持的重要组成部分。 Thus while the paranoid delusional system is divisive, exclusive, and is built out of the fabric of distrust, the belief system rests on shared conviction, mutual support, and trust. Some of Erikson's comments are very much to the point: 因此，偏执妄想系统是分裂的、排他的，是由不信任的结构建立起来的，而信仰系统则是建立在共同的信念、相互支持和信任之上的。埃里克森的一些评论非常到位： The psychological observer must ask whether or not in any area under observation religion and tradition are living psychological forces creating the kind of faith or conviction which permeates a parent's personality and thus reinforces the child's basic trust... in the world's trustworthiness.... All religions have in common the periodical childlike surrender to a Provider or providers who can dispense earthly fortune as well as spiritual health... the need for clearer self-delineation and self-restriction; and finally, the insight that individual trust must become a common faith, individual mistrust a commonly formulated evil, while the individual's need for restoration must become part of the ritual practice of many, and must become a sign of the trustworthiness of the community(1959, pp.64-65). 心理观察者必须问一问，在所观察的任何领域中，宗教和传统是否是活生生的心理力量，创造出一种信仰或信念，这种信仰或信念渗透到父母的人格中，从而加强了孩子对世界的基本信任……对世界的信任……所有的宗教都有一个共同点，那就是周期性的孩子式的向一个或多个提供者投降，他们既能分配人间的财富，也能分配精神上的健康……更明确的自我界定和自我限制 的需要；最后，个人的信任的洞察 必须成为一种共同的信仰，个人不信的洞察 必须成为一种共同制定的邪恶，而个人的恢复需要必须成为许多人的仪式实践的一部分，必须成为社会信任的标志(1959，pp.64-65)。 Putting it in these terms makes it clear that one cannot discriminate delusional from belief systems on the grounds of underlying needs, inner structure, relation to reality, or—a point which deserves emphasis—on the grounds of underlying mechanisms. The mechanisms of introjection, projection, and cognitive construction are detectable in both contexts. One need only recall the Christian doctrine of hell and diabolic influence to appreciate that Christian theology provides ample opportunity for the projection of hostile impulses—whether this belief be regarded as a total projection closer to delusion, or whether one regards the doctrine as enouncing a kernel of truth. But even here the projection serves to underline a common peril and reinforces the ties to the community. The mechanisms of belief tend to support the individual's participation and membership in the community, whereas the mechanisms of paranoia tend to isolate and exclude the individual from the real community of objects—the delusional network of suspicious and hostile interactions in a paranoid pseudocommunity is a far cry from meaningful sharing in the community of one's fellows. 从这些方面来说明，人们不能以潜在的需要、内在结构、与现实的关系为理由来区分妄想和信念系统，或者——这一点值得强调——以潜在机制为理由。在这两种情况下，内摄、投射和认知建构的机制都是可以检测到的。我们只需要回想一下基督教的地狱教义与恶魔的影响，就能了解基督教的神学为敌意冲动的投射提供了充分的机会——无论这种信念是否被视为接近妄想的完全投射，或者是否有人认为这种教义是在宣示一种真理的核心。但即使在这里，这种投射也是为了强调一种共同的危险，并加强与社会的联系。信仰的机制倾向于支持个体在共同体中的参与和成员身份，而偏执症的机制则倾向于将个体与真正的客体共同体隔离和排斥——在一个偏执伪共同体中，由怀疑和敌意的互动组成的妄想网络，与 自己同伴的共同体有意义的分享相去甚远。