Ego and Self 自我与自体 The analysis of the self was given a setting and an impetus by the observation of Heinz Hartmann (1950), in his observation that the essential element in narcissism must be a libidinal cathexis of the self rather than of the ego. The essential opposition between narcissism and object love in this view was not between ego and objects, but rather between self and objects. Freud had originally regarded the ego as the repository of narcissistic libido, but it was also clear that the ego as the repository of narcissism was difficult to reconcile with the picture of the ego as the systematic organization of functions by which internal regulation and control was organized and directed. Heinz Hartmann (1950)的观点给自体的分析提供了环境和动力，他认为自恋的基本要素必须是对自体的力比多精神投入，而不是对自我的。在这种观点中，自恋与客体爱的本质对立不是自我与客体之间的对立，而是自体与客体之间的对立。弗洛伊德最初将自我视为自恋力比多的贮藏所，但也很清楚，自我作为自恋的贮藏所，很难与自我作为系统性功能组织的图景相调和，内部的调节和控制就是通过这种功能组织和指挥的。 The ego was the executor of psychic energies, by which the direction of libido and its attachment to objects, or to the self, could not be easily reconciled with the previous view of the ego as a reservoir of narcissism. However, according to Hartmann's formulation, the quota of libido was stored in the self, as opposed to the ego. It was from the narcissism of the self that the ego was able to derive and direct energy to objects. The ego thus remains a system of functions, specialized and autonomous organ of adaptation, the centralized controlling and regulating agency of the personality structure. 自我是心理能量的执行者，据此，力比多的方向及其对客体或对自体的依恋，不容易与以前认为自我是自恋的蓄水池的观点相一致。然而，根据Hartmann的表述，力比多的配额是储存在自体中，而不是自我中。正是从自体的自恋中，自我才能够衍生出能量并将能量引导到客体上。因此，自我仍然是一个功能系统，是专门的、自主的适应器官，是人格结构的集中控制和调节机构。 These two aspects of the personality—ego and self—can be seen as following quite different developmental courses. Thus Levin (1969) can envision one course of development of the self and its relations to the object out of primary narcissism, and the second course of development of the organized system of ego functions out of an undifferentiated state of ego-id constituents. The child's narcissism is gradually differentiated into what Kohut (1966) has described as the narcissistic self along with the idealized parent imago. This forms the earliest stage of attachment of narcissistic libido to the primary object. The further course of development involves an increasing control of ego functions over the narcissistic self, so that the latter becomes gradually transformed into a self whose functions center on object relations. Levin comments, quoting Kohut: 人格的这两个方面——自我和自体——可以被看作是遵循完全不同的发展历程。因此，莱文(1969)可以设想，第一个发展过程是 自体及其与客体的关系从初级自恋中发展出来，第二个发展过程是 自我功能的组织系统从自我-本我成分的未分化状态中发展出来。儿童的自恋逐渐分化为Kohut(1966)所描述的自恋自体与理想化的父母意象。这形成了自恋力比多对主要客体的最早依恋阶段。进一步的发展过程涉及到自我功能对自恋自体的日益控制，从而使后者逐渐转变为一个功能以客体关系为中心的自体。莱文引用科胡特的话评论道： The two different paths of development come closer and closer together with the increasing attainment of a dominance of ego functions over the narcissistic self. We can say that the capability of the ego to manage, to tame and to transform these narcissistic energies of the self is at least one measure of ego strength. We do not believe that the task is ever complete. "The ego's mastery over the narcissistic self, the final control of the rider over the horse, is not achieved without a long struggle, and may after all have been decisively assisted by the fact that the horse, too, has grown old"(Kohut, 1966; Levin, 1969, p. 43). 随着自我功能对自恋自体的支配力的日益增强，这两条不同的发展道路越来越接近。我们可以说，自我管理、驯服和转化自体的这些自恋能量的能力，至少是衡量自我力量的一个标准。我们认为这项任务永远完成不了。"自我对自恋自体的掌握，即骑手对马的最后控制，并不是没有经过长期的斗争就能实现的，而且毕竟可能已经得到了决定性的帮助，因为马也已经老了"(Kohut，1966；Levin，1969，p.43)。 It must be remembered that introjection brings about a structural modification of the self. As we have already noted, it is difficult at times to locate specifically that structural modification in terms of the specific intra-psychic agencies. It is also clear that the self forms an intersystemic referent system which has specific relationships to the constituencies. Thus, if we speak of self-representations, these undoubtedly reflect the content of all of the intrapsychic agencies in combination. Thus the self-representations embrace id, ego and superego contents, expressing them in an objectified frame of reference. The self thus expresses in a form of intersystemic organization the reality of the intersystemic relations of the constituent agencies as placed over and against the object world. Thus it can be said that the introjects provide the content and the points of reference of the self-system—to use a Sullivanian term for the moment. 必须记住，内摄带来了自体的结构性改变。正如我们已经指出的那样，有时很难从具体的心理内机构的角度来确定这种结构性改变。同样清楚的是，自体形成了一个系统内的指涉系统，它与各机构之间有着特定的关系。因此，如果我们说到自体表征，这些表征无疑反映了所有心理内机构的内容组合。因此，自体表征包含了本我、自我和超我的内容，在一个客体化的参照系中表达它们。因此，自体以一种系统内组织的形式表达了构成机构的系统内关系的现实性，因为它被置于客体世界之上并与之相对。因此可以说，内摄物提供了自体系统的内容和参照点——暂且用一个沙利文的术语。