Relation to Self 与自体的关系 I would like to point out at this juncture in the consideration of introjective processes that the organization of introjects is closely involved with the setting up of the self. The concept of the self is one that has had a recent history in psychoanalytic reflection. I raise the question of the relationship between introjective processes and the formation of the self, since it seems to me that it forms a necessary component of the understanding of the paranoid process. 我想在考虑内摄过程的这一时刻指出，内摄物的组织与自体的设置密切相关。自体的概念在精神分析的思考中是有近代历史的。我提出了内摄过程与自体的形成之间的关系问题，因为在我看来，它构成了理解偏执过程的一个必要组成部分。 There is considerable divergence in point of view about the actual content and the intrapsychic function of the self. I will begin by basing the present consideration on the excellent analysis of the self provided by Levin(1969), to which I will append some of my own thinking on the question. I will also rely on Kohut's recent extensive discussion of clinical aspects of the self (1971). It is clear to begin with that, however one conceives of the self in the psychic economy, the notion of it does not function at the same level of abstraction or constituent functioning as the structural agencies which constitute the psychic apparatus—specifically the id, ego, and superego. As Kohut phrases it, the structural entities are experience-distant abstractions by which the psychic apparatus is conceived to be formed. The self, however, is conceptualized in a comparatively low-level and experience-near form of abstraction, rather as a content of the mental apparatus than as a constituent part of it. Kohut goes on to say: 关于自体的实际内容和心理内功能的观点有很大的分歧。我将首先根据Levin(1969)提供的关于自体的出色分析来进行目前的考虑，我将在此基础上附上我自己对这个问题的一些思考。我也将依靠科胡特最近对自体的临床方面的广泛讨论（1971）。首先，很明显，无论人们如何设想心理经济中的自体，它的概念并不像构成心理装置的结构性机构——特别是本我、自我和超我——那样，在同样的抽象或组成功能层面上发挥作用。正如科胡特所表述的那样，结构性实体是经验遥远的抽象，而心理装置就是通过这些抽象来设想形成的。然而，自体是以一种比较低级的、接近经验的抽象形式被概念化的，与其说是作为心理装置的内容，不如说是作为心理装置的构成部分。科胡特接着说。 While it is thus not an agency of the mind, it is a structure within since (a) it is cathected with instintual energy and (b) it has continuity in time, i.e, it is enduring. Being a psychic structure, the self has, furthermore, also a psychiclocation. To be more specific, various—and frequently inconsistent—self representations are present not only in the id, the ego and the superego, but also within a single agency of the mind. There may, for example, exist contradictory conscious and preconscious self representations—e.g., of grandiosity and inferiority—side by side, occupying either delimited loci within the realm of the ego or sectorial positions of that realm of the psyche in which id and ego form a continuum. The self, then, quite analogous to the representations of objects, is a content of the mental apparatus but is not one of the constituents, i.e., not one of the agencies of the mind (1971, p. xv). 虽然它不是一个心灵的代理，但它是一个内在的结构，因为(a)它是用本能催化的，(b)它在时间上具有连续性，即它是持久的。作为一个心灵结构，自体也有一个心里定位。更具体地说，各种——而且经常是不一致的——自体表征不仅存在于本我、自体和超我之中，而且也存在于心灵的单一代理之中。例如，可能存在着矛盾的意识和前意识的自体表征——例如，宏大和自卑——并排存在，占据着自我领域内的划定区域或心理领域的部门位置，其中本我和自我形成一个连续体。那么，自体，很类似于客体的表征，是心理装置的一个内容，但不是构成者之一，即不是心理的代理之一（1971，p.xv）。 That description of the self has a certain viability, specifically insofar as it serves the ends of Kohut's purposes in dealing with the vicissitudes of narcissism. But the status of a mental entity, which is at once structural yet not constitutive, provides some puzzlement. As I have suggested elsewhere(1971b, 1972), the meaning of the self cannot be regarded in simply representational terms—but rather the self reflects a structural component of the personality. 这种对自体的描述有一定的可行性，特别是在它服务于科胡特处理自恋变迁的目的的范围内。但是，一个既是结构性的但又不是构成性的精神实体的地位，提供了一些困惑。正如我在其他地方提出的(1971b，1972)，自体的意义不能简单地以表征的方式来看待，而是自体反映了人格的结构性成分。